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ARGUMENT 
In opposing Dr. GrauTs opening brief, Plaintiff does not dispute the 
dispositive proposition, that the 2004 Amendments to § 78-14-17 should not be 
applied retroactively because they affect the substantive rights of parties to physician-
patient arbitration agreements. That is because she cannot do so. It is indisputable 
that the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments not only affects Dr. GrauPs 
and Plaintiffs contractual rights and obligations under their Agreement, it affects the 
rights of all parties to physician-patient arbitration agreements entered into prior to 
May 3, 2004. Indeed, the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments will 
direcdy interfere with the contractual rights of parties to hundreds, if not thousands, 
of physician-patient arbitration agreements. The trial court should be reversed for 
this reason alone. 
In addition, Plaintiff further fails to dispute that the retroactive application of 
the 2004 Amendments violates the contract clauses of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions by substantially impairing—and invalidating—physician-patient 
arbitration agreements validly executed under prior versions of § 78-14-17. The 
instant case is illustrative. The trial court's decision clearly changes the meaning of 
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the Agreement and deprives Dr. Graul of her right to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate 
her claims, a right that Dr. Graul would have had under the 2003 version of § 78-
14-17. 
Plaintiffs attempts to avoid the contract clause issue by raising the procedural 
argument that Dr. Graul failed to adequately preserve the issue for appeal are 
without merit. Dr. Graul properly raised the issue in the trial court, preserved the 
issue in the appellate process and adequately briefed the issue in her opening brief. 
The issue of whether the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments violates 
the contract clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions is properly before 
this Court. 
Plaintiffs argument that the statute's mere inclusion of the date the original 
version was enacted constitutes an express declaration by the Legislature to 
retroactively apply the 2004 Amendments is similarly unavailing. Plaintiffs 
arguments contradict the strong presumption against the retroactive application of 
statutes and lack any support in relevant or binding authority. 
Finally, Plaintiffs arguments that the Agreement could not be renewed 
without violating the 2004 Amendments miss the point. The Agreement met the 
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requirements of the 2003 version of § 78-14-17(1) at the time it was executed and it 
never needed to be, nor was it ever renewed. As a result, it was not required to 
amend or re-execute the Agreement to bring it in compliance with the 2004 
Amendments. As a result, the Agreement is valid and enforceable. 
I. THE STATUTE'S INCLUSION OF THE DATE THE ORIGINAL 
VERSION WAS ENACTED IS NOT AN EXPRESS DECLARATION 
BY THE LEGISLATURE TO APPLY THE 2004 AMENDMENTS 
RETROACTIVELY. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that in Utah, there is a strong presumption against 
the retroactive application of statutes, and if the Legislature intends for a statute to 
apply retroactively, it must expressly and unequivocally declare this intent in the 
statute itself. Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80,11 39,104 
P.3d 1185 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000)). In her opening brief, 
Dr. Graul established that a plain reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17—and the 
2004 Amendments—reveals that the Legislature did not make an express declaration 
to apply any amendments to the statute retroactively. (See Dr. GrauPs Br. at § I.) 
As a result, the trial court erred in applying the 2004 Amendments retroactively to 
invalidate the Arbitration Agreement in this case. 
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In opposing this argument, Plaintiff parrots the trial court's reasoning that the 
statute's inclusion of the date the original version was enacted (i.e.. May 2, 1999) 
constitutes the Legislature's express declaration that any amendments to the statute 
must be applied retroactively. (PL's Br. at § I.) In an attempt to buttress this 
assertion, Plaintiff argues that cc[h]ad the legislature intended to apply the 
amendments only prospectively, as Dr. Graul avers, they would have simply drafted 
the enacting line of the statute to read, 'After May 3, 2004 . . .' The fact that the 
legislature did not do so is a sufficiently express declaration of retroactive intent." 
(Id at pp. 8-9.) 
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, however, the mere inclusion of the date the 
original version of the statute was enacted does not amount to an express declaration 
by the Legislature to overcome the strong presumption against the retroactive 
application of statutes. Fundamentally, neither the Legislature, nor the statute, 
demands that valid arbitration agreements be automatically undone by later-enacted 
amendments. 
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A. Plaintiffs Arguments Contradict the Presumption Against the 
Retroactive Application of Statutes. 
Noticeably absent from Plaintiffs arguments is an analysis of the strong 
presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. In addition, there is no 
mention of the Legislature's specific codification of this presumption that cc[n]o part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.55 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-3 (2000). Section 68-3-3 makes clear that the entire Utah Code, including 
the 2004 Amendments , are to be applied prospectively only, unless the Legislature 
expressly declares otherwise. Further, it is well-settled in Utah that if the Legislature 
intends to overcome the strong presumption against the retroactive application of 
statutes, it must expressly and unequivocally declare this intent in the statute itself. 
Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80,11 39, 104 P.3d 1185 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000)). 
A plain reading of § 78-14-17 reveals that it does not contain an express and 
unequivocal declaration by the Legislature that ccit is the intent of the Legislature that 
the requirements of this statute apply retroactively55 (see Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
302.5 (1995)), or that "the provisions of this section apply retroactively.55 See Utah 
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Code Ann. § 77-18-17 (1994). It merely contains the language "After May 2, 
1999, . . ." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004). 
Ostensibly recognizing the inadequacy of this alleged "express declaration" to 
retroactively apply the 2004 Amendments, Plaintiff attempts to turn the 
presumption against the retroactive application of statutes on it head by arguing 
cc[h]ad the legislature not wanted the 2004 Amendments to be applied retroactively, 
they would have said so by drafting the enacting language to state, cAfter May 3, 
2004.5" (PL's Br. at p. 7) (emphasis added). Indeed, the entire premise of Plaintiffs 
argument is to reverse the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes 
by arguing that the mere presence of the language "After May 2, 1999" 
demonstrates that any amendments to the statute are presumptively retroactive. 
Plaintiff further argues that if the Legislature intended for the 2004 Amendments to 
not apply retroactively, they were required to expressly declare so. Plaintiffs 
assertion, however, directly contradicts the presumption against the retroactive 
application of statutes codified in § 68-3-3. 
It is not surprising that Plaintiff resorted to an attempt to persuade the Court 
to reverse the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Indeed, 
because § 78-14-17 lacks any express declaration by the Legislature to apply it, or 
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any amendments, retroactively, Plaintiff is left with no choice. Plaintiffs attempt to 
perform an "end-run" around well-established principles of statutory construction 
should be rejected. 
B. Plaintiffs Argument Is Unsupported by Relevant or Binding 
Authority. 
Plaintiff fails to cite to any illustrative, let alone binding, authority in support 
of her argument that the mere inclusion of the date the original version of the statute 
was enacted constitutes an express declaration by the Legislature to retroactively 
apply the 2004 Amendments. That is because no such authority exists. 
Instead, Plaintiff argues that "Dr. Graul errs in demanding the legislature 
actually use the word Retroactive' instead of providing an earlier effective date as 
done here." (PL's Br. at p. 8.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to C.J.S. 
STATUTES § 408 (1999) for the proposition that the presence of the date the 
original version of the statute was enacted is an expression denoting past time similar 
to "heretofore35 or "has been,35 thereby giving the statute a retrospective operation. 
(See PL's Br. at p. 8.) Plaintiff then cites to the sole case mentioned in C.J.S. § 408 
in support of this proposition: the temporally remote 1940 New York case of Nervo 
7 
v. Mealey, 25 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. Sup. 1940). See C.J.S. STATUTES § 408 
(1999). Plaintiffs reliance on Nervo, and C.J.S. § 408, is misplaced. 
In a significant distinction from the instant case, Nervo involved an arcane 
traffic law in 1940's New York governing the suspension of chauffeurs5 licenses. 
Section 78-14-17, however, prescribes the contractual rights and obligations of 
parties to modern day physician-patient arbitration agreements. Indeed, it is unclear 
whether the retroactive application of the statute in Nervo affected the contractual 
rights and obligations of chauffeurs in 1940fs New York, or whether the court 
considered this consequence in issuing its ruling. Further, the court in Nervo does 
not provide any analysis of why the terms "has been53 sufficiently expressed the 
legislature^ intent to apply the statute retroactively. The court merely states ccit is 
mandatory that the Commissioner restore the license and certificate of registration 
no matter when revoked for the use of the words chas been5 or csome other 
expression denoting past time is construed as retrospective, when constitutional 
difficulties do not forbid.5551 Id. at 634 (citing McKinney's Consolidated Laws, 
1
 Given the Nervo court's lack of analysis on the issue, one cannot help but 
wonder if the Nervo court would allow the retroactive application of a statute if such 
application violated the contract clause of both the state and federal 
Constitutions—as in this case. (See § III. infra.; see also Dr. GrauPs Br. at § III.) 
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Book 1, page 74). In short, the only case law cited by Plaintiff is non-binding, 
temporally remote, factually distinguishable and non-illustrative. 
II. THE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT 
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 78-14-17 WHEN IT WAS 
EXECUTED AND WAS NEVER RENEWED. 
Plaintiff concedes that the Agreement met the requirements of the 2003 
version of § 78-14-17 when it was executed in April of 2003. (PL's Br. at p. 5.) 
Accordingly, there is no dispute that the Agreement met the requirements of 
Subsection (1) of the statute on at least one occasion, namely, when it was executed. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1) (2004). As established in Dr. Graul's opening 
brief, this fact renders the agreement valid and enforceable under the second 
alternative in § 78-14-17(1). (See Dr. Graul's Br. at § IV.) In opposing this 
conclusion, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Graul misinterprets the alternative nature of 
Subsection (1) of § 78-14-17 by placing significant import on the term "this" in the 
Subsection. Plaintiffs argument misses the point. 
cThe best evidence of the legislature's intent and purpose [in enacting 
statutes] is the plain language of the statute." Eastern Utah Broadcasting and 
Worker's Compensation Fund v. Labor Comm'n? 2007 UT App 99, II 8,158 P.3d 
1115. Subsection (1) of § 78-14-17 reads: "After May 2,1999, for a binding 
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arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed, or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met 
on at least one occasion, renewed . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1). Contrary 
to Plaintiffs assertions, Dr. Graul does not place emphasis on the term "this" when 
interpreting Subsection (1). Rather, she places emphasis on the entire phrase: ccor, 
if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least 
one occasion, renewed . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1). 
A plain reading of this language shows that an arbitration agreement is validly 
executed if it met the requirements of previous versions of § 78-14-17(1) on at least 
one occasion. The execution of the Agreement in this case is illustrative. In April of 
2003, the 2003 version of Subsection (1) was in effect. The Agreement was 
executed in April of 2003 and Plaintiff concedes that the Agreement complied with 
the requirements of the 2003 version of Subsection (1) when it was executed. Thus, 
the requirements of this Subsection (1) have been met on at least one occasion, 
namely, when it was executed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(1). Accordingly, 
the Agreement is valid and enforceable. 
In addition, the Agreement continues to be valid and enforceable because it 
never needed to be renewed, nor was it renewed. Under Subsection (1), if the 
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Agreement needed to be renewed after the initial one-year term to cover future 
ongoing care of Plaintiff, it would have needed to be amended or re-executed to 
bring it in compliance with the 2004 Amendments. The Agreement, however, never 
needed to be renewed because the physician-patient relationship between Dr. Graul 
and Plaintiff did not last more than a few months, if that. In other words, there was 
no need to renew the Agreement to cover future or ongoing care of Plaintiff. Thus, 
the Agreement remains valid and enforceable under the 2003 version of § 78-14-
17(1). 
Plaintiff opposes this conclusion by arguing that under the automatic renewal 
clause of the Agreement, it was automatically renewed twice and because it was 
never amended or re-executed to bring it in compliance with the 2004 Amendments, 
it is invalid. (PL's Br. at p. 12-13.)2 Plaintiffs argument ignores the indisputable 
fact that the Agreement was not renewed and, thus, never needed to be amended or 
re-executed to bring it into compliance with the 2004 Amendments. 
2
 As an initial matter and contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the automatic 
renewal provision under Article 6 of the Agreement is triggered only when the 
physician-patient relationship continues beyond the one-year term of the Agreement. 
Indeed, there is no need to renew an arbitration agreement between a physician and 
patient when there is no further health care services to be covered by the agreement. 
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cThe existence of a physician-patient relationship between a physician and an 
individual can only be recognized when the individual is in fact a patient." Toseph v. 
McCann, 2006 UT App 459, If 12, 147 P.3d 547. This relationship "is consensual, 
and one in which the patient knowingly seeks the assistance of a physician and the 
physician knowingly accepts him as a patient.35 Id (internal quotations omitted). 
Accordingly, the relationship terminates if the patient no longer seeks the assistance 
of the physician, or the necessity which gave rise to the relationship is no longer 
present. See id. 
In the instant case, the physician-patient relationship between Plaintiff and 
Dr. Graul terminated following the surgery on May 10, 2003, because Plaintiff never 
returned to Dr. Graul for any further heath care or treatment and the necessity 
giving rise to the surgery was no longer present. [R. 91, pp. 14-16.] Further, the 
term of the Agreement was one year from the date of signing (Le ,^ until April 28, 
2004) and only needed to be renewed if the physician-patient relationship between 
Plaintiff and Dr. Graul continued beyond that point. As a result, the automatic 
renewal provision was never triggered because the physician-patient relationship 
between Plaintiff and Dr. Graul did not continue beyond the April 28, 2004 
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renewed date. Thus, there was no need, nor opportunity, to renew the Agreement 
to bring it into compliance with the 2004 Amendments. 
III. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
OF THE 2004 AMENDMENTS VIOLATES THE CONTRACT 
CLAUSES OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS WAS ADEQUATELY PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL. 
Significantly, Plaintiff fails to oppose Dr. GrauTs argument that the retroactive 
application of the 2004 Amendments violates the contract clauses of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. That is because she cannot do so. It is undisputable 
that the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments violates the contract clauses 
of the Utah and United States Constitutions by substantially impairing—and 
invalidating—existing physician-patient arbitration validly executed under prior 
versions of § 78-14-17. See Washington Nafl Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 
P.2d 665, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Indeed, in the instant case, the trial court's 
decision clearly changes the meaning of the Agreement and deprives Dr. Graul of her 
right to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims, a right that Dr. Graul would have 
had under the 2003 version of § 78-14-17. See idL The trial court should be 
reversed for this reason alone. 
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In an effort to avoid this conclusion. Plaintiff raises a procedural argument 
that this Court should not consider the contract clause issue because Dr. Graul failed 
to adequately preserve it for appeal. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that ccDr. Graul did 
not include this argument in her initial brief in support of her Motion to Compel 
Arbitration" and "failed to raise the issue to a level of consciousness before the trial 
court.55 (PL's Br. at p. 9.) Plaintiffs procedural argument is without merit. 
In order to properly preserve an issue for appeal, a constitutional argument 
"must be raised in the trial court, preserved through the appellate process, and 
adequately briefed.55 State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,1118, 164 P.3d 397. There is 
no magic formula for an adequate constitutional analysis. Id, Applying these 
principles to the instant case, Dr. Graul adequately preserved the contract clause 
argument for consideration on appeal. 
Dr. Graul raised the issue in the trial court in her Reply Memorandum in 
Support of her Motion to Compel Arbitration. [See R. 48-49.] Indeed, in her 
Reply Memorandum, Dr. Graul specifically stated cc[r]etroactive application of the 
2004 Amendment would obviate the one-year term specified by statute and in the 
Arbitration Agreement, would impair the contractual relationship between parties, 
and would fail to pass muster under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Utah 
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Constitutions, which prohibits laws "impairing the obligations of contracts." U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Utah Const. Art. I, § 18. [Id] 
In addition, the issue was sufficiendy raised to a level of consciousness before 
the trial court. The fundamental crux of a contract clause argument is whether 
existing contracts will be impaired by the application of a law or statute. See 
Washington Nat l Ins. Co., 795 P.2d at 670. Likewise, the entire focus of 
Dr. GrauTs argument in her Reply Memorandum, and at the hearing, against the 
retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments centered on the fact that if the 
2004 Amendments are applied retroactively, they will impair Dr. GrauTs ability to 
enforce the Agreement. [R. 47-49; 91.] Indeed, the trial court was well aware of 
the obvious consequence that the retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments 
was to negate Dr. GrauPs contractual right to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her 
claims, and Plaintiffs corresponding obligation to arbitrate her claims. [R. 91.] 
The contract clause issue was also preserved in the appellate process and 
adequately briefed. The issue being considered in the instant appeal is whether the 
2004 Amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 should be applied retroactively. 
(Dr. GrauTs Br. at p. 1.) The contract clause issue is subsumed in the issue on 
appeal because the unavoidable consequence of applying the 2004 Amendments 
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retroactively is a violation of the contract clauses of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. In addition, the issue was adequately briefed in Dr. GrauPs opening 
brief. (See Dr. GrauTs Br. at § III.) Thus, the issue of whether the retroactive 
application of the 2004 Amendments has been adequately preserved for appeal and is 
properly before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Graul respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court and hold that the 2004 Amendments to § 78-14-17 should not 
be applied retroactively. 
Respectfully submitted this <M day of December, 2007. 
WILLIAMS & H U N T 
By 
ELucmr rlviLiiAMS 
STEPHEN T. HESTER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Elizabeth S. Graul, M.D. 
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